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Acronyms 
AEP annual energy production 
AMI Area of Mutual Interest 
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BOEM Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
CapEx capital expenditures 
CF capacity factor 
COD commercial operation date  
CRMF Cost Reduction Monitoring Framework 
DOE  U.S. Department of Energy 
DWW Deepwater Wind 
FC financial close; triggers ability to enter contracts for construction 
(project financing) or drawdowns for construction 
expenditures (balance sheet financing); for this study, U.S. 
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years followed by 6 month site commissioning prior to wind 
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FID final investment decision; Typically used in context of equity 
decision, stage in a financial agreement where conditions 
have been satisfied or waived and documents executed; 
triggers draw-downs and project execution.  
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HVAC high-voltage alternating current 
HVDC high-voltage direct current 
IO&M installation, operations, and maintenance 
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kW kilowatt 
LCOE levelized cost of energy 
MW megawatt 
N/A not applicable 
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O&M operation and maintenance 
OCS Outer Continental Shelf 
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OpEx operational expenditures 
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SIOW Special Initiative on Offshore Wind 
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USD United States dollar 
WACC weighted average cost of capital 
WEA wind energy area 
WRF weather research and forecasting model  
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Executive Summary 
 This	study	models	the	cost	of	electricity	from	2,000	MW	of	offshore	wind	energy,	deployed	off	the	coast	of	Massachusetts	throughout	the	period	2020-2030.		We	find	that	costs	will	be	far	lower	than	previously	contracted	prices	for	offshore	wind	in	the	New	England	region	and	that	costs	will	continuously	lower	throughout	a	build-out	during	the	decade,	due	to	ongoing	technology	and	industry	advances	and	the	effects	of	making	a	Massachusetts	market	visible	to	the	industry.						The	“levelized	cost	of	energy”	(LCOE)	was	above	24¢/kWh	for	previously	contracted	projects	in	New	England	including	the	Cape	Wind	project	proposed	for	Massachusetts	and	the	Block	Island	Wind	farm	off	the	coast	of	Rhode	Island	–	the	latter	is	currently	in	construction	and	will	be	the	US’s	first-built	offshore	wind	farm.1			The	results	of	the	modeled	2,000	MW	build-out	show,	first,	that	the	LCOE	for	the	initial	offshore	wind	project	--	16.2¢/kWh	--	will	be	much	lower	than	projects	to	date.		Second,	the	study	shows	that costs continue to decline in subsequent builds, so 
that by the last tranche of a 2,000 MW pipeline of projects, the LCOE reaches 10.8¢.  
Table ES-1 below displays the LCOE’s across the analyzed build-out, with and without 
transmission costs included, and including learning effects.  
 
Table ES-1. LCOEs for 2,000 MW build-out - 2020 -2030a   
 
 Tranche A 
400MW 
COD 2023 
Tranche B 
800MW 
COD 2026 
Tranche C 
800MW 
COD 2029 
LCOE without transmission 
(2016¢/kWh) 
12.4¢ 9.8¢ 7.9¢ 
LCOE with transmission 
(2016¢/kWh)  
16.2¢ 12.8¢ 10.8¢ 
a Cost reductions reflect market visibility and learning effects. 
                                                
1 Using published PPA terms in Musial and Ram (2010), Large-Scale Offshore Wind Power in the United 
States:  Assessment of Opportunities and Barriers, p. 119, and converted to levelized cost. 
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The metric of this study is calculated LCOE, which does not consider any Federal 
production tax credit, state renewable energy credits (RECs) or potential carbon fees, any 
of which would lower the actual price below our LCOE projection.  The study does not 
address the overall comparative value of the technology versus other ways of producing 
electricity. This is because LCOE does not consider system benefits, job creation, 
environmental, or health benefits, any of which would improve the relative cost of 
offshore wind power. 	In	addition	to	the	anticipated	technology	improvements	that	will	lower	the	cost	of	offshore	wind	energy	through	the	next	decade,	the	primary	mechanism	of	the	observed	downward	trajectory	illustrated	in	Table	ES-1	is	development	of	offshore	wind	at	scale.		Commitment	to	scale	provides	“market	visibility”	to	the	industry,	which	lowers	cost	over	time.	Table	ES-2	illustrates	two	recent	one-off	project	proposals	in	the	area,	compared	with	three	tranches	of	the	modeled	pipeline	of	2,000	MW.		Compare	in	particular	the	first	and	third	lines,	468	and	400	MW,	two	projects	of	about	the	same	size.		Tranche	C	benefits	from	subsequent	technology	improvements,	but	also	benefits	from	the	much	greater	market	visibility,	the	two	effects	together	generating	the	substantial	reduction	in	LCOE	seen	in	the	last	column.			
Table	ES-2.		Impact of scale:  Comparison of New England LCOEs   
Project	 Anticipated	
Financial	
close		
(year)	
Project	size	
(MW)	
OSW	Market	
Visibility		
in	New	
England	(MW)	
LCOE	
(¢/kWh)	
	MA	project	proposed	 2014a	 468	 400	 24¢b	RI	project	under	construction	 2015	 30	 30	 30¢c	Tranche	A	(this	study)	 2020	 400	 2,000	 16.2¢	Tranche	B	(this	study)	 2023	 800	 2,000	 12.8	¢	Tranche	C	(this	study)	 2027	 800	 2,000	 10.8¢	a	Proposed	Cape	Wind	project	has	not	yet	reached	financial	close.			b	Calculated	from	National	Grid	PPA	terms,	reported	in	Musial	and	Ram	(2010),	converted	to	LCOE.	c	Calculated	from	PPA	terms	reported	in	Musial	and	Ram	(2010),	converted	to	LCOE.	
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	Market	visibility	reduces	cost	by	generating	competition	among	developers	and	their	suppliers	and	by	creating	a	community	of	experienced	project	investors	who	see	less	risk	and	thus	expect	lower	rates	of	return.		Market	visibility	is	achieved	by	government	policy	that	commits	to	the	build-out	of	a	sequence	of	projects,	as	opposed	to	a	policy	for	one	single	project,	which	has	been	previously	seen	in	Massachusetts	and	other	East	coast	states.	 Also, building a series of projects leads to 
experienced workforce for subsequent projects, which becomes more efficient as they 
learn by doing.  
 From	the	authors’	previous	work	on	cost	reduction	and	U.S.	state	policy,	there	are	potentially	additional	cost	savings	unrelated	to	scale	that	can	be	affected	by	state	policy	that	further	reduce	risk.		The	provision of site characteristic data, requiring 
winning bidders to share certain information in advance of future builds, and investing in 
infrastructure and workforce development, all are policy options that can reduce cost, but 
were not analyzed in this study. 
 
As a check on the results, we benchmarked our LCOE results with two studies that report 
costs and cost trends seen in Europe. The cost trend for Massachusetts’s projects is 
consistent with the trend line of declining cost among recent and planned European 
projects.   The first Massachusetts tranche analyzed yields a LCOE that is still at the high 
end of European cost projections.   By the end of the last tranche of a 2,000 MW pipeline, 
Massachusetts LCOEs have reached a price range that is competitive in today’s U.S. 
market.   	
To conduct the study, we elicited estimates of each of the major costs of developing, 
building, financing, and operating an offshore wind project—from industry experts who 
are actively creating or receiving bids for components and services for projects in the 
region.  This set of inputs was used to calculate LCOE.   
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Collecting forward-looking data from industry participants involved in a particular 
market differs from the approach of most prior studies, which estimate future costs from 
already-built projects in Europe.  Because it can require six years from conceiving to 
financing, to building, to operating an offshore wind project, using already-built projects 
to infer costs of future projects just now conceived would give data as much as 12 years 
out of date--misleading in a rapidly-changing field of technology and industrial 
development.   
Introduction 
 
There is currently discussion in Massachusetts regarding a possible requirement that 
utilities in the state purchase electricity generated by offshore wind, approximately 2,000 
MW over a ten-year period.2  The only offshore wind projects in New England, the 
proposed Cape Wind project, and the under-construction Block Island Wind Farm 
(BIWF), do not provide relevant cost information.  These two projects were “one-off”, 
i.e. not part of a planned sequence of offshore wind at a multi-project scale.  Also, Cape 
Wind’s design was specified many years ago and BIWF is a small demonstration-size 
project.    
 
This study calculates what the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) would be from a pipeline 
of offshore wind projects in the Massachusetts-area Wind Energy Areas (WEA’s).   We 
assume the deployment of 2,000 MW of offshore wind (OSW) in the currently existing 
lease holds within designated WEAs of New England, with deployment occurring 
between 2020 and 2030.  The study considers multiple factors that have been 
hypothesized to impact the LCOE of OSW energy when it is deployed at the gigawatt 
(GW) scale.  
 
                                                
2 Legislation introduced in 2015 (“An Act to Promote Energy Diversity”) would have required a series of 
solicitations for offshore wind totaling 8,500,000 MWh/year by 2030.  At a 45% CF that would be about 
2,100 MW capacity which we here refer to as 2,000 MW capacity.  In 2016, an omnibus energy bill is 
being drafted in the Massachusetts House Energy Committee, which may include an offshore wind carve-
out. 
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LCOE is used as a metric to compare across projects and across energy sources.   It gives 
the price that would be charged for electricity, if based on actual costs, and if charged at 
the same rate every year of the project life.   
Background 
 
Offshore wind power has been identified, analyzed and discussed for a decade as a 
potential electricity resource for US coastal states, with the Northeast of particular 
interest.  Studies have identified the northeast resource as a much larger clean energy 
resource than on-land wind or rooftop solar, with the Northeast offshore wind potential 
enough to supply all electricity used by those coastal states.3  The resource is close to 
Eastern load centers and many areas have strong winds at times approximately 
corresponding to peak load hours.4,5 Wind trade organizations also claim that, due to the 
size of components and transportation costs, and labor-intensive construction and 
operations, offshore wind has the potential to create a new industry and thousands of jobs 
that cannot be exported out of the region.6  For example, construction and installation 
jobs and operations and maintenance jobs – inherently local jobs – constituted more than 
50% in new offshore wind jobs in the UK between 2010 and 2013, a period of significant 
growth in offshore wind there.7,8 
 
                                                
3 Kempton, Willett, Cristina L. Archer, Richard W. Garvine, Amardeep Dhanju and Mark Z. Jacobson, 
2007, Large CO2 reductions via offshore wind power matched to inherent storage in energy end-uses. 
Geophysical Research Letters, 34, L02817. doi:10.1029/2006GL028016 
4 Garvine, Richard W. and Willett Kempton, 2008, Assessing the wind field over the continental shelf as a 
resource for electric power, Journal of Marine Research 66 (6): 751-773. (Nov 2008). 
5 Michael J. Dvorak, Eric D. Stoutenburg, Cristina L. Archer, Willett Kempton, and Mark Z. Jacobson, 
2012, Where is the ideal location for a US East Coast offshore grid? Geophysical Research Letters, Vol. 
39, L06804, doi:10.1029/2011GL050659. 
6 http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/files/library/publications/reports/Deep_Water.pdf; For MW # cite to 2013 
EWEA report available at 
http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/files/library/publications/statistics/European_offshore_statistics_2013.pdf 
and most recent EWEA report (first half of 2014) available at http://www.ewea.org/statistics/offshore/ 
7 Renewable UK (2013).  Working for a Green Britain and Northern Ireland 2013-23, p. 29.  
http://www.renewableuk.com/en/publications/index.cfm/working-green-britain 
8 Renewable UK.  http://www.renewableuk.com/en/news/press-releases.cfm/record-breaking-year-of-
growth-for-uk-wind-energy 
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The primary drawback to adoption of offshore wind power has been the cost of electricity 
produced.9  Although one high-profile case of opposition of coastal residents has 
captured media attention,10,11 public view shed opposition has not been a significant 
source of opposition in other US or European installations.12  Based on the second 
author’s multi-year experience with state governments considering offshore wind, the 
primary barrier to adoption has been cost.  Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) prices for 
most of the earliest proposed projects were well over market price for electricity.13   
 
This has been true in other regions, for example in Europe, where now more than 11 GW 
of offshore wind energy are deployed. The European market, driven in large part by 
binding national CO2 goals, went through an initial period of high cost and the need for 
large subsidies to make project economics work.  An additional problem in a market with 
few technology suppliers is that pricing can be set to the subsidy rather than set by costs.  
Like other new technologies, for example personal computers or solar photovoltaic 
panels, initially high costs can be brought down by constantly improving technology, 
greater competition among OEMs as well as parts and services suppliers, mass 
production, and industrialization of the installation and O&M operations.  For offshore 
wind, as described next, an additional driver of cost-reduction was that governments who 
were paying subsidies told the industry that they would have to bring prices down to 
unsubsidized market levels in order to continue, as discussed next. 
                                                
9 Levitt Andrew C.; Kempton Willett; Smith Aaron P.; Walt Musial; and Jeremy Firestone, 2011, Pricing 
offshore wind power. Energy Policy 39 (10): 6408-6421.  doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.07.044 
10 Robert Whitcomb, Wendy Williams, 2007, Cape Wind: Money, Celebrity, Energy, Class, Politics, and 
the Battle for Our Energy Future.  New York: Public Affairs books. 
11 Kempton, W., J. Firestone, J. Lilley, T. Rouleau and P. Whitaker, 2005, The Offshore Wind Power 
Debate: Views from Cape Cod, Coastal Management 33 (2): 119-149. Published 
doi:10.1080/08920750590917530 
12 Firestone, Jeremy, Willett Kempton, Meredith Blaydes Lilley, and Kateryna Samoteskul, Public 
acceptance of offshore wind power across regions and through time, 2012, Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management, 55:10, 1369-1386. doi:10.1080/09640568.2012.682782 
13 See Musial, Walt and Bonnie Ram. 2010. Large-Scale Offshore Wind Power in the United States: 
Assessment of Opportunities and Barriers. NRELTP-500-40745. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory. http://www.nrel.gov/wind/pdfs/40745.pdf., p. 119. 
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European public-private initiatives to reduce cost 
Acknowledging offshore wind’s unique benefits and its high costs, early in this decade 
European national governments together with industry initiated a number of cost 
reduction efforts.   From the Carbon Trust’s Offshore Wind Accelerator – a joint 
partnership of nine developers initiated to reduce costs by 10% in time for the United 
Kingdom’s “Round 3” of offshore wind deployment – to The Crown Estate’s14 Cost 
Reduction Pathways Study, the UK arguably took a leadership role in pushing and 
facilitating offshore wind cost reduction.  In 2011 The Crown Estate undertook an 
evidence-based study to identify and quantify cost reduction opportunities for the 
offshore wind industry.  The study identified the drivers and dependencies of offshore 
wind costs, through consultation with industry, and “provided a platform for the 
government, project developers, the supply industry and operators to align future 
activities and maximize cost reductions.”15  The report generated confidence – and in turn 
a challenge to the UK offshore wind industry – that offshore wind could reach electricity 
costs of £100/MWh  (14¢/kWh)16 for projects reaching Final Investment Decision (FID) 
in 2020.17  That challenge spawned a variety of public-private partnership work streams 
to pursue the technological innovation, supply chain efficiencies and financing hurdles 
that would successfully achieve the £100/MWh target.  	
 
In addition to efforts in the United Kingdom, industry and government agencies in 
Denmark also developed formal collaborations to reduce the cost of offshore wind energy 
to reach a target of €100/MWh (11.2¢/kWh) for offshore wind energy. 18The “Cost 
Reduction Forum” was launched in September, 2014 by Offshoreenergy.dk, the Danish 
government’s official national knowledge center and innovation network for the Danish 
                                                
14 The Crown Estate is the quasi-governmental agency in the United Kingdom, which owns and manages 
the collection of land and holdings that belong to the British monarch, including the seabed.   
15 The Crown Estate (2012).  Offshore Wind Cost Reduction Pathways Study.  
http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/5493/ei-offshore-wind-cost-reduction-pathways-study.pdf 
16 Throughout this text when electricity prices are given in foreign currency we convert to USD, using 
March 2016 conversion rate of £1 = $1.43 and €1 = $1.11.  When the units are $/MWh, we also convert to 
the more widely familiar consumer unit ¢/kWh ($100/MWh = 10¢/kWh).   
17 By Final Investment Decision in 2020, not projects going into operation in 2020. 
18 Germany as well analyzed the potentials of decreasing the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) of offshore 
wind power in Germany over the period 2013-2023.  For more details see Fichtner Prognos (2013), Cost 
Reduction Potentials in Offshore Wind Power in Germany.  
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offshore industry.19  In addition, the Danish Wind Industry Association launched 
Megavind, a partnership of Danish industry, academics, and government who work in a 
coordinated effort to accelerate technological innovation to make offshore wind energy 
competitive with other electricity generating resources.  Together they set an ambitious 
goal to cut the levelized cost of offshore wind energy 50% for investment decisions in 
2020 compared to comparable sites with investment decisions in 2010.20 
 
The Netherlands, and Belgium also are engaging in activities to reduce the cost of 
offshore wind energy, for example, carrying out site characterization activities and 
partially permitting areas -- prior to holding auctions for development rights and power 
off-take agreements. Both of these activities can reduce uncertainty and provide 
developers and investors with ability to predict costs and performance with improved 
certainty. Less risk generally means that developers can reduce contingencies and offer 
lower power prices.21 
Measured progress towards cost reduction in Europe 
Following the UK’s government and industry’s initial period of joint activity, they 
continued to work together to assess offshore wind energy costs and evaluate progress in 
bringing those costs down; the UK’s “Cost Reduction Monitoring Framework” (CRMF) 
as it is referred to, carries out two activities:  1) evaluating the progress of cost reduction 
activities across the spectrum of key cost drivers in an offshore project and 2) collating 
actual costs information on projects which have achieved the milestones of Final 
Investment Decision and/or Works Completion.22 
 
                                                
19 Funded by Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation. 
20 Megavind (2013).   "The Danish Wind Power Hub."3 
21 National Renewable Energy Lab (2015).  2014-2015 Offshore Wind Technologies Market Report, p. 18. 
22  The Cost Reduction Monitoring Framework is a collaboration between the UK Offshore Wind 
Programme Board, the Offshore Wind Industry Council, the UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change and The Crown Estate.   
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The CRMF reported in 2014 that progress in reducing the cost of offshore wind energy 
had been made during the years 2010-2014.23  “For projects reaching FID, the industry 
average LCOE was £142/MWh (20.3¢/kWh) in 2010-2011 and £121/MWh (17.3¢/kWh) 
in 2012-2014.  For projects reaching Works Completion, the industry average LCOE was £136/MWh (19.4¢/kWh) in 2010-2011 and £131/MWh (18.7¢/kWh) in 2012-2014.”  
Larger turbines, improved technology, and efficiency were credited with lowering costs 
as was greater competition in the supply chain.  The monitoring effort underscored 
however the need for systematic improvement in work force and risk reduction with 
respect to supply chain failures as areas in need of continued emphasis to achieve cost 
reductions.   
 
In 2015, an independent analysis commissioned by Statkraft UK further examined the 
progress being made and projected where the industry could be in the next decade,24 their 
summary table is reproduced below as Table 1 (with £ converted to US$).  Despite water 
depth and distance to port and grid increasing as closer and shallower sites are developed, 
there is nevertheless an overall downward trend in cost of electric energy, seen in the 
rightmost column.  
 
                                                
23 Deloitte, August 2015 "Establishing the Investment Case -- Wind Power" 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/dk/Documents/energy-resources/Deloitte-Establishing-
wind-investment.pdf 
24 BVG Associates, 2015, Offshore Wind:  Delivering More for Less.  http://statkraft.com/globalassets/4-
statkraft-uk/offshore_wind_more_for_less_pages.pdf 
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Table 1.  Historical and projected factors affecting cost of offshore wind projects in the 
UK (Source: BVG Associates 2015; USD added) 
Year 
Turbine 
size 
Project 
size 
Water 
depth 
Distance 
to port / 
grid 
Wind 
speed at 
100m 
Cost of 
energy 
offshore 
wind 
(MW) (GW) (m) (km) (m/s) ($/MWh) 
2005 2 – 3 < 0.1 15 – 25 10 – 30 8.5 – 9.0 225 – 275 
2010 3 – 4 0.3 – 0.6 25 – 35 10 – 60 9.0 – 9.5 217 – 272 
2015 6 – 8 0.6 – 0.8 20 – 45 20 – 120 9.3 – 9.7 150 – 194 
2020 7 – 9 0.6 – 1.2 30 – 45 50 – 240 9.5 – 10.0 109 – 157 
2025 8 – 10 0.6 – 1.2 30 – 45 50 –240 9.5 – 10.2 
92 – 149 2025 (repowered) 
8 – 10 0.2 – 0.4 15 – 25 10 – 60 8.5 – 9.0  
2030 10 – 12 0.6 – 1.2 30 – 45 50 – 240 9.5 – 10.2 
76 – 142 2030 (repowered) 
10 – 12 0.3 – 0.6 25 – 30 10 – 60 9.0 – 9.5 
 
 
 
The Danish Energy Agency with Denmark’s energy systems operator (Energinet.dk) 
have also tracked offshore wind costs and reductions, including future cost reductions 
anticipated.25  Table 2 below indicates the Danish government’s assessment of the 
expected innovations in offshore wind technology and the concomitant reductions in 
offshore wind energy costs.  The bottom three rows are costs, and we add a rightmost 
column to show the reduction in cost of components and services from 2015 to 2030.  
The highest cost capital items are projected to drop by 30%.  The 2050 column (outside 
the time scope of this study) shows continued decline in costs. 
 
                                                
25 Danish Energy Agency and Energinet.dk (2012). Technology Data for Energy Plants –Generation of 
Electricity and District Heating, Energy Storage and Energy Carrier Generation and Conversion.  Område: 
Statistik & fremskrivninger.  ISBN/Nr.: 978-87-7844-931-3  
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Table 2.  Projected costs of offshore wind subsystems and operations (From Danish 
Energy Agency and Energinet.dk, with column added for cost reduction 2015-2030). 
Technology Large wind turbines offshore (year of investment decision) 
Cost change 
2015 – 2030 
(%)   2015 2020 2030 2050 
Average generating capacity 
per turbine (MW) 4 – 6 6 – 10 10 – 16 10 – 20 
  
Rotor diameter (m) 110 – 155 155 –180 180 – 200 180 – 250   
Hub height (m) 80 – 100 95 – 115 115 – 125 115 – 155    
Annual average plant capacity 
factor (%) 46 – 48 48 – 50 50 – 52 51 – 53 
  
Availability (%) 96 97 97 98   
Technical lifetime (years) 25 25 25 30   
Construction time (years) 2 – 4 2 – 4 2 – 4 2 – 4   
Financial data           
Specific investment, total costs 
(M€/MW) at 20m depth and 
30km from shore ex. Grid 
connection to shore 
3 2.5 2.1 1.8 – 30%  
Grid connection to shore 
(M€/MW) 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32 – 8% 
O&M (€/MWh) 19 17 16 15 – 16%  
 
 
A recent market report that combines several of these sources is the September 2015 U.S. 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s (NREL) U.S. Offshore Wind Market Report.  
The Market Report is one of a variety of reports funded by the U.S. Department of 
Energy, providing quantitative, independent data for use by the wind industry and its 
various stakeholders, including policy makers, regulators, developers, financiers, and 
supply chain participants.26  From the report: 
“In 2015, Denmark and the United Kingdom held competitive auctions for 
price support, which resulted in the lowest power prices for offshore wind 
in recent history. Vattenfall won the competitive tender for the 400-MW 
Horns Rev III project in Denmark, and will receive a subsidy of 770 
DKK/MWh ($134/MWh) for the first 50,000 MWh of operation. In the 
United Kingdom, [Contract for Differences] CFDs were awarded to 
Mainstream Renewable Power for the 448-MW Neart Na Gaoithe project 
and to Iberdrola for the 714-MW East Anglia ONE project. The winning 
bids for these projects were £114.4/MWh ($184.5/MWh) and 
£119.9/MWh ($193.3/MWh), respectively.”27,28 
                                                
26 NREL, p. 6.  
27 NREL, p. 77. 
28 The developer of East Anglia ONE reached Final Investment Decision in February 2016 for the project.  
(http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-suffolk-35650590).  It was reported that the developer secured a 
price support contract of £119/MWh through the UK's first renewable energy auction process.  
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Megavind, the Danish public-private partnership, has also pointed to the Horns 
Rev III tender as illustration that the industry is reaching its targets, citing a 32% 
reduction in cost, from the Anholt wind farm also in Denmark (tendered in 2010).  
Deloitte in an August 2015 report writes “ . . . innovation and standardization are 
expected to help the industry in realizing its cost reduction targets.”  Deloitte 
continues, reporting that Horns Rev III and Anholt tenders correspond to a 
reduction of 28% before adjusting for general inflation.”29 
 
Figure 1 is drawn from the NREL Market report.  The cost/MWh scale was 
converted from Pounds and Euros and adjusted by NREL to $201430 per MWh, 
and reflects Real LCOE, excluding subsidies.  The black line in Figure 1 from 
2012 to 2020 is the goal set by the UK government, in partnership with industry, 
for cost reduction.31  (The extension of the black line to 2030 as shown by NREL 
is under discussion in the UK but is not now an agreed-to UK goal.) The colored 
shapes represent actual wind projects, with those before 2016 (squares) 
representing an average of operating built projects, and those of 2016 and after 
(triangles and circles) representing signed contracts to sell power at a set rate.  
The green hollow circle is a project in Danish waters—in that country the 
transmission cost is paid by the grid operator not the developer, so the NREL 
analysts used a second filled circle to show their estimate of project cost including 
transmission, making the filled green circle comparable to the other prices 
represented by filled points on the graph. 
 
Figure 1 shows several things.  First, the UK government set a price reduction 
target, and industry did not make that target the first year, did slightly better the 
second year shown (blue squares) and all subsequent projects have continued to 
stay below the goal. 
                                                
29 Deloitte (2015).  “Establishing the Investment Case – Wind Power,” p. 10. 
30 Using US Bureau of Labor Statistics calculators, for example, at http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm 
31 The black line from 2020-30 indicating a lower target of £85/MWh by 2030 is not the official UK 
government target, according to reviewers of this study. 
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The key driver of these initial reductions, according to communications with UK 
peer reviewers for this study, were the targets set through industry and 
government collaboration.  According to the CRMF, the commercialization and 
rapid adoption of turbines with larger nameplate ratings (6‒8 MW) and increased 
power conversion efficiency was the key technological driver of lower costs. 
These larger machines reduce CapEx and OpEx by minimizing the number of 
units that must be installed and maintained while increasing performance. Other 
innovations in vessel technology and balance of systems are also contributing to 
the lower cost levels. NREL analysis suggests that favorable macroeconomic 
factors also play a role, such as stable commodity prices, low activity in the 
offshore oil and gas sector, and international exchange rates.32  
 
Figure 1.  LCOE of multiple UK and Danish offshore wind projects.33,34  Each 
project’s Real LCOE is calculated and converted to $2014 USD.  Source: NREL. 
                                                
32 NREL, p. 80. 
33 NREL, p. 80. 
34 As noted in the NREL report, the source for Figure 1, there are significant uncertainties associated with 
comparing power off-take prices because of differences in project scope (e.g., in the United Kingdom, 
developers pay for grid connection, whereas in Denmark that responsibility lies with the TSO), market 
structure (e.g., tax rate and depreciation structure), site characteristics (e.g., wind speed, water depth, and 
distance from shore), and contractual terms and conditions (e.g., contract length and treatment of inflation). 
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Second, looking at now-contracted projects awaiting FID (triangles and circle), 
the cost reduction trend continues with the Vattenfall winning bid for Horns Rev 
3 being notably lower than a linear curve from the built projects.  
 
As one more background study, a research note by Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
(BNEF) examined potential cost reductions in offshore wind.  BNEF undertook the 
examination in order to understand how feasible the industry’s targets are, and how they 
could be achieved.35  According to their analysis, BNEF found that offshore wind cost is 
likely to reach as low as $122/MWh (12.2¢/kWh), and they argue that a 20% learning 
curve would be required to reach the UK’s $110/MWh (11¢/kWh) target by 2020.36  In a 
separate “bottom up” analysis, BNEF examined the key components of offshore wind 
CapEx and OpEx and their respective cost reduction potentials to determine how the 
targets could be met.  Similarly, their “bottom-up analysis” suggests offshore wind 
industry could reach $122/MWh (12.2¢/kWh), still short of the UK target.37 However, 
BNEF assumed an industry target of 2020 for a commissioned project.38  While press 
reports often describe the target as  “£100/MWh by 2020,” the substantive underlying 
reports and analyses regarding the European targets clarify that the targets are for projects 
reaching Final Investment Decision (FID) by 2020, not commissioning in 2020.39  The 
time interval from FID to commissioning is roughly two to three years.  When BNEF’s 
erroneous target date is corrected the UK’s 2020 target would be much closer to being 
met than BNEF’s summary suggests. 
	
                                                                                                                                            
Real LCOE offers a better metric for comparison and can be approximated by averaging the total revenue 
stream that the project would anticipate over its lifetime and accounting for the effects of inflation (See 
NREL report for further discussion of assumed anticipated revenue streams). 
35 Bloomberg New Energy Finance (August 2015). “Route to offshore wind 2020 LCOE target:  From 
riches to rags.”  Report distributed to Bloomberg clients. 
36 BNEF, p. 1. 
37 BNEF, p. 4 
38 BNEF, p. 4. 
39 The Crown Estate (2012).  Cost Reduction Pathways Study, p. vii.   
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Implications for U.S. LCOEs 
The dearth of real U.S. project proxies, with none for any potential market of scale,40 the 
considerable activity in the global industry to reduce cost, and policymaker questions 
about costs led SIOW to examine what the cost of energy from offshore wind projects 
would be in the near future in the US market under different policy assumptions.  Our 
first study was of the New York Bight, examining the impact of the anticipated cost 
reductions in the global market on New York projects, and how US or state policy would 
further affect price.41  SIOW, working with New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority, obtained cost figures for the technology that is expected to be in 
the market for projects that will reach FID in 2020 and applied those costs figures to a 
hypothetical build-out of projects off of Long Island, NY over the period 2020-2023, a 
plausible time frame for development and installation there.42   
 
SIOW found that by moving to the larger, more efficient turbines expected to be 
available when New York area projects are likely to reach Financial Close, along with 
other technology and supply chain innovations, the LCOE would be 22% lower than if 
built with the smaller turbines that had been bid in earlier projects on the East coast.43,44  
 
SIOW’s New York study also examined the impact of learning in the installation and 
operations and maintenance of offshore wind farms, as capacity grows in New York and 
                                                
40 PPA’s for projects proposed and power contracts negotiated in the U.S. either in the last decade (Cape 
Wind) or earlier this decade (BIWF) do not provide any real indicator to what costs for U.S. projects today 
can achieve. Cape Wind’s power contract was bid and negotiated long before the successful cost reduction 
initiatives in the global offshore wind industry. BIWF is a small demonstration project.  And other more 
recently bid projects such a Dominion’s Virginia Offshore Wind Technology Advancement Project, 
Fishermen’s Energy’s Atlantic City project and a demonstration size floating project in Coos Bay, Oregon 
are all very small demonstration projects that do not reflect projects costs of larger wind farms.  
Additionally none of these contracted nor bid US projects have been bid within the context of a visible, 
longer-term context of a visible pipeline of projects – the approach contemplated in the legislation currently 
being considered in Massachusetts.  
41 McClellan et al (2015).  New York Offshore Wind Cost Reduction Study. 
42 Input data used by SIOW to calculate LCOE’s were obtained from BVG Associates.   
43 McClellan, p. S-4. 
44 Costs reflecting incremental technological innovation were modeled in a hypothetical build-out of four 
projects, in different water depths and distances from shore; the cost reductions across the buildout reflect 
not only the technological advancement but also the differences in project site characteristics. 
 19 
in the region.  Learning effects further reduced the LCOE of the hypothetical New York 
offshore wind projects.45   
 
Lastly, the study examined the impact on LCOE of various New York State policy 
measures that were identified by the study team as potentially decreasing costs, above 
and beyond the impact of technology advancement and industry learning.  Those policy 
measures included creating “market visibility,” (a committed-to sequence of projects), 
reducing project risk through a variety of both revenue policy design steps as well as pre-
development steps to increase visibility on site conditions.   
 
Policy measures had various impacts, with market visibility having the greatest impact.  Market	visibility	reduces	cost	by	generating	competition	among	developers	and	their	suppliers,	and	by	creating	a	community	of	experienced	project	investors	who	see	less	risk	and	thus	expect	lower	rates	of	return.				Market	visibility	is	achieved	by	government	policy	that	commits	to	the	build-out	of	a	sequence	of	projects,	as	opposed	to	a	policy	for	one	single	project,	as	previously	seen	in	Massachusetts	and	other	East	coast	states.	  
 
In short, the study found that New York Bight projects would benefit from the cost 
reduction efforts of the global industry, but that state policy commitment to scale creates 
market visibility and creates learning effects, with both significantly lowering the cost of 
offshore wind energy.  Market visibility and scale are in contrast with one-off projects 
like Cape Wind or BIWF.   
 
SIOW felt a Massachusetts-specific study would be helpful to understand recent industry 
changes and the effects of the policies being discussed.  Therefore this study seeks to 
understand what the LCOE would likely be from 2,000 MW of OSW deployed in the 
currently existing lease holds within designated WEAs of New England, with deployment 
occurring over the years between 2020 and 2030.  
                                                
45 McClellan, p. S-6. 
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Methods 
 
To calculate cost for potential Massachusetts projects, we identified a potential sequence 
of build areas within WEAs, performed expert elicitation on expected costs, and 
calculated LCOE.  These are described below.   
How to elicit cost data for not-yet-built US projects? 
Given the rapid decline in costs and lack of built projects in the US, standard cost 
estimation methods as cited above, did not seem adequate.  Due to the planning time 
required, an offshore wind project with lease today might see financial close in 2020, 
construction completed in 2023.  Existing studies that analyze projects recently 
completed in 2015 in Europe could be 6 to 8 years behind the pricing of future projects 
we seek for the first Massachusetts projects. Thus, studies of already-build projects are 
inherently backward-looking.  In addition, they are in the North Sea not US waters.  
Expert elicitation  
To address the backward-looking and Europe-data problems, we identified a source for 
regionally-relevant, up-to-date cost data.  Three offshore wind developers have leased the 
right to develop ocean area off Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and we believe that all 
of them have recently requested quotations from turbine manufacturers and contractors, 
at these sites or in the region.  Additionally, at least three turbine suppliers have 
examined this area or other US sites to understand costs and their potential market.  This 
group of developers and suppliers has therefore presumably been carefully evaluating the 
metocean conditions and logistics of the area, and we inferred that they would already 
have either quotations or careful internal evaluations of cost.  (Note: in this industry, the 
turbine manufacturers (OEMs) are more likely to cost estimate the entire project than do 
other suppliers e.g. vessel operators, which is why we sought cost estimates from 
developers and OEMs, not other suppliers).  
 
One major concern from these expert sources is confidentiality—they will be bidding 
against each other and would not allow any of their individual data to be released to their 
competitors.  To solve the confidentiality problem, the second author (McClellan) 
requested, and eventually obtained, agreements with these experts that they would 
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provide cost data to us and we would develop a single number from their collective 
inputs.   The experts required that no individual’s inputs would be revealed; only the 
combined average number would be published.   
 
Appendix B provides more detail on how we performed the expert elicitation and how we 
dealt with possible sources of bias.  In brief, we carefully picked expert teams, and 
elicited from them each of the component costs, using expert elicitation methods 
developed by Morgan et al.46 Then we evaluated each expert’s cost for each component, 
and averaged those costs.  In most cases we also made one to three follow-up queries or 
interviews to understand how they answered our cost questions, including their 
assumptions.  When we felt some sources were less well informed, we weighted them 
less in the average, but all estimates were included in each of the resulting cost 
component inputs, with the results shown in Appendix A.  As noted, the transmission 
cost was calculated separately, by our own analysis, and is added to the total LCOE as a 
separate step.  Transmission cost inputs are also located in Appendix A.  All other inputs 
used in the LCOE calculations can also be found in Appendix A. 
 
In post-elicitation reviews of the inputs with the experts, we determined that two did not 
correctly follow instructions regarding the assumption of market visibility.   We had 
instructed the experts to give component costs without assuming market visibility, that is, 
to provide cost inputs for each tranche, assuming that it was the only one being built. In 
post-elicitation follow up interviews we discovered that two companies’ commercial 
analyses had already begun, based on a pipeline of projects, and that, the costs they 
provided to us included an assumption of market visibility. Therefore, we did not apply 
any additional market visibility to those costs for our analyses.  To examine the effect of 
market visibility on cost, we compare with two proposed projects in the region that had 
no market visibility at all beyond their one project build. 
                                                
46 Morgan, M. Granger (1990). Uncertainty: A Guide to Dealing with Uncertainty in Quantitative and Risk 
and Policy Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
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Levelized cost of energy 
LCOE is a commonly used metric for the cost of electricity produced over the lifetime of 
the project. The general inputs for calculating LCOE for OSW are capital expenditures, 
operating and maintenance costs, cost of capital, and the expected annual energy 
production of the OSW farm.  For a project generating electricity from fuel, the cost of 
fuel would be added to the LCOE.47,48    
 
Because contracts can be short-term and can include escalators or fuel adders, the LCOE 
is a metric that improves the ability to compare across fuel sources.  Many renewable 
sources can assure a price over the entire life of the project.  Fuel-based generation can be 
estimated over long periods only in relation to predictions of future fuel prices, so their 
LCOE inherently has an uncertainty over the lifetime of the facility.   
 
LCOE normally does not include any subsidies, RECs, carbon credits, or health benefits.  
For example, when the US production tax credit is active the PPA price could be lower 
than the LCOE by 2.2 ¢/kWh.49   Or, if the emissions benefits were considered as part of 
the price, studies of land-based wind in the mid-Atlantic show that each MWh power 
produced by wind, by displacing existing generation, produces savings in health and 
climate change costs of $81 to $110MWh (8.1 – 11¢/kWh).50  None of those are included 
in the LCOEs or in the analysis here. 
 
                                                
47 LCOE is the equivalent unit cost ($/MWh or ¢/kWh) that has the same present value as the total cost of 
building and operating a generating plant plus investor returns over the power plant’s life divided by total 
electrical generation. See explanation with Levelized Cost of Electricity Calculator, NREL, 
http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech_lcoe.html 
48 LCOE calculation does not include the cost of balancing, which would be minimal for the 2,000 MW 
build contemplated here. One U.S. utility’s calculation for adding 2 to 3 GW of wind is an integration cost 
of $3.70/MWh (0.37¢/kWh)  (Final Report: Public Service Company of Colorado 2 GW and 3 GW Wind 
Integration Cost Study.  Attachment 2.13-1.  Prepared by Xcel Energy Inc.  and EnerNex Corp.  August 19, 
2011.  A general discussion is (Michael Milligan, Erik Ela, Bri-Mathias Hodge, Brendan Kirby, Charlton 
Clark, Jennifer DeCesaro, and Kevin Lynn, and Debra Lew, 2011, “Cost-Causation and Integration Cost 
Analysis for Variable Generation.” Technical Report NREL/TP-5500-51860, June 2011.  
49  See Musial and Ram 2010, Large Scale Offshore Wind Power in the United States: Assessment of 
Opportunities and Barriers. NREL/TP-500-40745, p. 119.  
50 Jonathan J. Buonocore, Patrick Luckow, Gregory Norris, John D. Spengler, Bruce Biewald, Jeremy 
Fisher and Jonathan I. Levy, 2016, “Health and climate benefits of different energy-efficiency and 
renewable energy choices” Nature Climate Change, 6, 100–105, Table 5.  DOI: 10.1038/nclimate2771 
 23 
We use a public-domain cost of energy modeling tool, NREL’s CREST, that accepts the 
component cost inputs as described above, and calculates LCOE as an output.51  Thus, by 
describing our procedure, providing all inputs used, and using a public tool to develop 
LCOE, our results are transparent, and can be confirmed by any other analyst. 
 
LCOE, an analytic measure, is comparable but not identical to commercial measures such 
as a PPA price.  A PPA price is a negotiated or bid quantity, and the seller may set that 
price differently from LCOE based on many factors, such as favorable tax treatment.  A 
PPA can have a price escalator through time, so that price is lower initially and higher 
later, by definition not “levelized.” A PPA price is generally quoted only for the energy, 
in $/MWh or ¢/kWh, while in fact a wind generator may sell other electricity products 
such as capacity or ancillary services, in which case the energy PPA alone could be lower 
than LCOE as calculated.  In addition is the developer’s market strategy.  For example, to 
maximize market share a seller could bid below cost, or a monopolistic seller without 
competition might bid well above the LCOE.  
Identifying tranches and sites to model LCOE 
There are two federally designated wind energy areas in the Massachusetts area, the 
Rhode Island and Massachusetts area of mutual interest (RIMA AMI) and the 
Massachusetts Wind Energy Area (MA WEA).  Auctions were held by the Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), which leased RIMA AMI and two of the three 
areas of MA WEA in 2014 and 2015.   These areas are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
                                                
51  (http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/models_tools.html), 
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Figure 2.  Wind Energy Areas.  The RIMA WEA (blue plus brown), and two areas of the 
MAWEA (tan and yellow) are now leased.  The green area of MA WEA has not yet been 
leased.   
 
We developed three “indicative tranche areas” for OSW development that capture a range 
of the site characteristics.  The site characteristics of the three tranches are displayed in 
Table 3.    
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Table 3.  Site Characteristics for three tranches. 
Tranche 
	Water	depth	 	Wind	speed	(m/s)	
	Distance	to	port	(miles)		
	Distance	to	interconnect	
 
  
 	 	 	 Offshore	 Onshore	
A 35.8 9.3 43.3 40 miles 0.2 miles 
B 38.8 9.4 45.5 38 miles 4 miles 
C 38.8 9.4 45.5 48 miles 4 miles 
 
Figure 3 shows an illustrative map of Tranches A, B and C.  Each tranche area is actually 
a blend of possible choices for each tranche, so the red lines on Figure 3 show an 
approximation, not precise boundaries.  Note that Tranche A is smaller, 400MW, whereas 
Tranches B and C are larger to accommodate 800MW each. The approach of using 
tranches, rather than developer lease areas or individual projects, is to simplify the 
analysis, to not assume one most cost-effective build size, and to not link our LCOEs 
with lease areas of one particular developer.  The reason that we modeled a smaller first 
Tranche is that subsequent tranches would likely be lower cost as described below.   
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Figure 3.  One example of possible Trances A, B and C, shown in red. 
 
Wind speeds and energy production 
Analysis of wind speeds for the three indicative tranches were purchased from a vendor, 
Natural Power, and were based on a combination of reanalysis data and the weather 
research and forecasting model (WRF).  Because wind speeds are fairly uniform over the 
entire area including RIMA and the MA WEAs, we were able to capture the site 
variability with just two point measurements.  The hourly wind speeds at 100m height 
above sea level was used in a model of wind farm layout with spacing 10D x 10D and 
thus power density of 2.97 MW/km2, to estimate wake losses. This model results in a net 
annual energy production (AEP), after subtracting wake loss, and equivalently, a net 
capacity factor (CF), with “net” in both cases referring to the sum of electrical output 
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from all wind turbines, having subtracted wake loss but not electrical cable losses.52  AEP 
and CF were based on the power curve for the MHI Vestas 8 MW turbine.53  The CF and 
thus AEP is likely to increase over time for the WEAs of this study, as the blade on the 
MHI Vestas is a bit undersized for this wind regime.54  A similar issue has been identified 
for this turbine-blade combination in European projects.  Thus as either European market 
growth continues, or if a sufficiently-large market emerges in the US Northeast, we may 
see larger rotors developed to operate more efficiently in these environments.55  Due to 
such factors, we used the expert elicitation to check our CF, even though this is a number 
we derived ourselves (experts gave similar numbers, but which CF increasing through 
time). 
 
Transmission analysis 
Like the wind speed analysis, we did our own analysis of transmission cost rather than 
relying on costs from the expert elicitation.  There are several possible transmission 
solutions for each project, and for the set of projects if they decided on a joint 
transmission solution.  We were advised that our expert interviewees could not give 
estimates for comparable transmission solutions at this point.   Therefore, we carried out 
an analysis of the simplest transmission solution, a single AC line from each tranche to 
shore.  This was based on models of our third author (Ozkan) who is an expert on subsea 
transmission.  To fit within existing on-shore points of interconnection (POI) and to 
minimize need for upgrades to existing lines, two points on the high voltage system were 
selected, Oak Street and Brayton Point.     
 
The other option would be a common 2,000 MW HVDC line from the three leased areas 
to two interconnection points on shore.  An HVDC system would likely provide system 
                                                
52 Niranjan S. Ghaisas, and Cristina L. Archer (2015). Geometry-based models for studying the effects of 
wind farm layout, Journal of Atmospheric and Oceanic Technology. doi: 10.1175/JTECH-D-14-00199.1 
53 SIOW used the published graph of the power curve of the MHI Vestas 8.0-164, and fitted a polynomial 
to it, for use in these calculations. 
54 Also, layout improvements can be made to the economics by dense outer perimeters and possibly over-
planting can further reduce the LCOE 
55 The desirability of a larger rotor on the 8 MW machine even in Europe was identified by Adrian Fox, 
personal communication. 
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benefits (power could be moved from one connection point to another on-shore, 
providing a “system benefit” to the existing on-land transmission system).  For 
simplicity, we use only cost for a route requiring no cooperation among developers, 
although this may not be the lowest cost if all factors are considered.  Because of new 
offshore wind transmission products already being introduced, we included a cost 
reduction factor on transmission through the 2020-30 time period.56 As noted earlier 
along with the elicited wind farm costs, transmission analysis cost inputs can be found in 
Appendix A.  
 
Market and policy assumptions 
We made assumptions regarding the offshore wind market in the northeast and other 
relevant federal polices, in calculating LCOE’s across the tranches.  Among Maryland, 
New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island, there is a total of 3,750 MW either in enacted 
legislation or under discussion. We	conservatively	assumed	that	only	half	of	this	would	be	built	(outside	Massachusetts)	between	Tranches	A	and	C.		That	is,	in	addition	to	the	2,000	MW	of	offshore	wind	development	in	Massachusetts	over	2020-30,	another	1,875	MW	are	built	in	the	Northeast	and	Mid-Atlantic region	during	the	same	period.   The regional 1,875 and Massachusetts 2,000 MW are added to 
calculate learning on Tranches B and C.  
 
We assumed no federal production tax credit, no federal investment tax credit, no REC 
sales, and no state subsidies.  The tax and depreciation rates assumed are typical for 
privately-owned productive assets, shown in Appendix A, Table A2. 
 
Supply chain and vessel assumptions 
Because we were relying on the knowledge of industry experts who are currently 
examining the logistics for Massachusetts offshore wind farms, we did not impose 
assumptions regarding localization of supply chain, deployment approach, or vessels.  
                                                
56 http://www.windpoweroffshore.com/article/1338456/analysis-siemens-radical-
substation-plan 
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Rather, in follow up interviews we obtained the assumptions used by our expert 
informants in these categories, which are described below.   
. 
Tranche A:  Turbine systems are manufactured in Europe and stored in a local buffer 
port.  Foundations and onshore substations are manufactured in the US, according to two 
of the three companies. The assumed extra cost from shipping and plus an extra handling 
step were not seen as a significant cost adder to the CapEx, especially given fluctuations 
in exchange rates and commodity prices.   
   
Regarding vessels, all three developers agreed that there would be no US flagged heavy 
lift vessels capable of turbine installation for Tranche A. All assumed a feeder barge 
arrangement, that is, using a combination of US vessels loading in port, and European 
specialized installation vessels that only operate offshore.”  Cable installation vessels 
were also assumed to be European. 
 
Tranches B & C:  All major components manufactured in the US if there is sufficient 
quantity and certainty of Massachusetts plus regional wind power market. The experts 
also assumed that by Tranche B, there will be US flagged vessels, again assuming the 
development of a US market.57    
Results: Massachusetts LCOEs 
 
This section reports the anticipated LCOEs for the three tranche areas – with and without 
the further impact of learning effects as the U.S. market matures.   LCOEs are presented 
both with and without transmission included.   
 
Overall, global cost reductions in OSW technology and U.S. market maturation will 
lower the cost of OSW installations resulting in lower LCOE for Massachusetts OSW 
                                                
57 Development of U.S.-flagged vessels was reported as being less dependent on certainty of volume than is 
local supply chain, as U.S.-flagged vessels could potentially support the future European and Asian markets 
in addition to a U.S. market. 
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projects, compared to previous project LCOE’s in the New England area.   Continuation 
of these trends, a commitment to a pipeline, and larger project sizes, in combination, lead 
to reductions in cost over time as seen in Table 4.  The inputs to LCOE analyses, showing 
reductions in input costs, can be seen in Appendix A.  Table 4 below provides those 
LCOE’s that consider the economies of a full 2000 MW build-out. 
 
Table 4. Baseline LCOE assuming 2,000 MW Massachusetts pipeline of projects but no 
learning effects. 
 
Tranche A 
400MW 
COD 2023 
Tranche B 
800MW 
COD 2026 
Tranche C 
800MW 
COD 2029 
LCOE without transmission (2016 ¢/kWh) 12.4¢ $10.5¢ $8.7¢ 
LCOE with transmission (2016 ¢/kWh) 16.2¢  13.5¢ 11.5¢ 
 
Estimating the impact of learning on Massachusetts LCOE’s 
To calculate the learning effects from any further market development in the U.S. 
between FC in 2020 and 2030, the study team applied a 5% learning curve per doubling 
of capacity based on a review of top-down statistical analyses of offshore wind learning 
curves, conducted in 2013 by the Brattle Group.58 The Brattle Group assessment 
discovered LCOE cost reductions ranging between 3% and 10% per doubling of capacity 
and considered some of the seemingly-contradictory factors that have been driving up 
offshore wind costs over the past few years to be temporary.59 These learning rates were 
also found to be consistent with those historically observed for onshore wind. Brattle 
interpreted 3% learning as a slow learning rate and 10% as high and suggested using a 
5% intermediate value. In this study, we applied this intermediate learning rate of 5% per 
doubling of capacity only to its estimates for support structure, installation and O&M 
costs.60   We did not apply the learning rate to the wind turbine system (rotor-nacelle 
                                                
58 Weiss, Jurgen, M. Sarro and M. Berkman (2013). “A Learning Investment-based Analysis of the 
Economic Potential for Offshore Wind: The case of the United States,” prepared for the Center for 
American Progress, the U.S. Offshore Wind Collaborative, the Clean Energy States Alliance and the Sierra 
Club.  
59  Weiss et al, p. 23. 
60   Two experts in post-interviews plus one peer reviewer, all of whom were especially knowledgeable of 
European cost trends, have suggested that our use of a 5% learning rate is too low.  If that is correct and if 
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assembly and tower) because those are manufactured by OEMs (for many customers), so 
the learning rate is already included in their price quotations. 
 
Table 5.  LCOE assuming 2,000 MW Massachusetts pipeline of projects and learning 
effects. 
 Tranche A 
400MW 
COD 2023 
Tranche B 
800MW 
COD 2026 
Tranche C 
800MW 
COD 2029 
LCOE without transmission 
(2016 ¢/kWh) 
12.4¢ 9.8¢  7.9¢  
LCOE with transmission 
(2016 ¢/kWh) 
16.2¢  12.8¢  10.8¢ 
 
Impact of market visibility on LCOE  
In SIOW’s offshore wind cost reduction analyses for New York, we determined that 
market visibility – a commitment to a certain volume of OSW (a pipeline of projects) 
over a defined period of time – reduces cost of offshore wind energy by these 
mechanisms:  1) creating competition by interesting additional entrants (suppliers, 
vendors, etc.) to the market; and 2) attracting over time investors with a lower hurdle rate, 
as infrastructure and other investors enter the space, replacing “pioneer” investors with 
high expected rates of return.   
 
The study team learned from experts interviewed for the New York study that the 
competition created by a visible pipeline of projects, versus the market entrants likely for 
a “one-off” project only, could likely reduce CapEx, maintenance and insurance costs 
from 10 – 20%.  Also by generating repeated investment by equity investors with sector 
knowledge and experience, as opposed to pioneer investors, WACC could be lowered by 
reducing the cost of equity by as much as 3%.61  Market visibility for offshore wind can 
be achieved by government policy that commits to the build-out of a sequence of 
projects, as opposed to a policy for one single project.  Table 6 compares the LCOE for 
                                                                                                                                            
our volume assumptions are correct, then the LCOE prices we estimate for Tranche B and C should be 
lower than we show in this report. 
61 McClellan (2015).  New York Offshore Wind Cost Reduction Study, p 38.  
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Tranches A, B, and C (given a visible pipeline of projects) versus LCOE’s for other 
offshore wind projects that had been bid and contracted without market visibility.   
 
Table 6.  Impact of scale:  Comparison of New England LCOEs  
Project	 Anticipated	
Financial	
close		
(year)	
Project	size	
(MW)	
OSW	Market	
Visibility		
in	New	England	
(MW)	
	
LCOE	
(¢/kWh)	
	
MA	project	proposed	 2014a	 468	 400	 24¢b	RI	project	under	construction	 2015	 30	 30	 30¢c	Tranche	A	(this	study)	 2020	 400	 2,000	 16.2¢	Tranche	B	(this	study)	 2023	 800	 2,000	 12.8	¢	Tranche	C	(this	study)	 2027	 800	 2,000	 10.8¢	
a Proposed Cape Wind project has not yet reached financial close.   
b Calculated from published National Grid PPA terms reported in Musial and Ram, converted to LCOE. 
c Calculated from published PPA terms reported in Musial and Ram, converted to LCOE. 
 
Table 6 illustrates clearly the effects we are discussing.  The prior one-off projects in the 
New England region have been much higher cost than would be projects as part of a 
systematic policy-driven pipeline with market visibility.  Again, the reasons for the lower 
prices starting 2020 in Table 6 are:  Technology improvements coming from Europe, 
market visibility of a Massachusetts commitment to 2,000 MW in addition to a similar 
quantity in the northeast region, and, for Tranches B and C, learning effects, and 
localization of supply chain. 
Benchmarking our results  
The LCOE’s calculated from the expert inputs are less than prior US projects, as shown 
in Table 6.  Given what is happening in the global industry, this should be expected.  
However, the U.S. has no offshore wind farms in its waters, no mature supply chain nor 
dedicated infrastructure similar to that in Europe.    How do our estimated LCOE’s for 
Massachusetts’s projects in the modeled tranches compare to what is happening in the 
global market?  We benchmarked our findings against two different sources of data:  1) 
the latest European tenders (illustrated in Figure 1 above); and 2) ranges of LCOE’s 
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anticipated between 2020-30 in the UK, as projected by BVG Associates for Statkraft 
UK.  
 
In Figure 4, we have plotted the estimates for the three Massachusetts tranches, assuming 
learning and market visibility against the UK Cost Reduction Goals, the LCOE averages 
of projects evaluated for the UK Cost Reduction Monitoring Framework (operational 
2010-2015), and the latest European tenders (operational 2019 and 2020).   
 
The Massachusetts LCOE’s (blue circles in Figure 4) follow the downward trajectory as 
the LCOE averages of projects evaluated for the CRMF, and the UK cost reduction 
targets. Moreover, as can be seen, the Massachusetts LCOE’s can reach prices of the 
2019-20 operating European projects (triangles), albeit not until 2023.  US projects 
becoming operational in 2023 still do not reach the level of the Horns Rev III project – 
Europe’s lowest bid (mainly because Tranche A is the first US project, but also because 
Horns Rev III is in shallower water and closer to shore62 than the MA WEA).   
 
In short, this benchmarking suggests that Massachusetts projects would follow the same 
declining cost trajectory as has been seen over time in Europe.  
                                                
62 Energinet.dk, 2013, “Horns Rev 3: Technical Project Description for the large-scale offshore wind farm 
(400 MW) at Horns Rev 3.”  Dokument nr. 106078/13, sag 12/827 – Dated 030513  
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Figure 4.  This report’s estimated Massachusetts LCOEs (blue circles) benchmarked 
against European LCOEs.  (Original figure from NREL report, referenced in this report’s 
prior Figure 1.)63 
 
 
As a second benchmark, the study team compared our Massachusetts findings against the 
LCOE ranges projected by BVG Associates.64  Those ranges in are shown in blue bars in 
Figure 5.  SIOW’s estimates for Massachusetts are plotted in orange circles.  Figure 5 
shows that at the beginning of the U.S. market (Tranche A with financial close in 2020), 
LCOE’s are at the high end of the BVG Associates projected LCOE range.  By 2030, 
however, we find the latter stage Massachusetts projects are reaching the mid-range of 
the projected European projects. 
                                                
63 Massachusetts project estimates appear on Figure 4 after they have been converted into nominal LCOE’s 
$2014 to better match the Real LCOEs $2014 that NREL placed on the original figure.  This results in the 
LCOEs on this graph being slightly different from our $2016 nominal figures reported elsewhere in this 
document.  Also, as noted, there are uncertainties associated in comparing PPA and LCOE prices because 
of differences in project scope, market structure, and site characteristics. 
64 BVG Associates, 2015, “Offshore Wind:  Delivering More for Less,” an independent study 
commissioned by Statkraft. Technical Annex, p. 12. 
MA#LCOE#+#Transmission#
MA#LCOE#Expert#Judgment#
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Figure	5.   Estimated Massachusetts LCOEs, Benchmarked against Projected LCOE 
(data from BVG Associates).   
 
The benchmark against the BVG projections, like the check against the data summarized 
by NREL, show that our calculations for Massachusetts are consistent with trends in the 
industry.  As noted, in addition to assuming a continuing market in Europe, these findings 
are not automatic.  They occur only with market visibility, that is, a firm commitment by 
Massachusetts plus other activity in the region.  Experts comments also explained that 
they assumed European-based supply chain and vessels in Tranche A, transitioning to 
local supply chain and U.S.-built ships in Tranches B and C. Along with learning, these 
are the reasons Tranches B and C show lower cost.  
Conclusion 
 
To reliably project the cost of a rapidly-changing technology in the future, for example, a 
project that would be built and commissioned about six years ahead of the analysis, we 
developed an expert elicitation method.  We solicited confidential expert estimates of 
 36 
each of the major costs of developing, building, financing, and operating an offshore 
wind tranche, then arrived at a weighted mean of those estimates and used the mean 
values as input to the public-domain CREST tool to produce the LCOE for each Tranche.  
We added the cost of a simple transmission solution, without eliciting data for that 
component. 
 
We found that our projected costs are consistent with two published benchmarks, and 
show a trend line of declining cost over the 2020-2030 period due to the factors cited.  
The LCOE for the first tranche begins with an electricity price above today’s market.   
Costs continue to decline in subsequent builds, so that by the last tranche of a 2,000 MW 
pipeline, costs are similar to today’s market cost, and at that point the technology 
presumably could continue to compete on its own without any continuing legislation.  
Dividing the decade into three tranches, LCOE costs with learning effects on installation 
and operations and maintenance were 12¢, 9.8¢ and 7.8¢ per kWh, or including 
transmission were 16.2¢, 12.8¢ and 10.8¢ per kWh.  Again, these are calculated LCOE, 
which does not consider any Federal tax credit, state RECs or potential carbon fees, any 
of which would lower the actual price below our LCOE projection. 
 
The cost reductions are driven by state policy committing to build a sequence, of projects 
as well as “learning effects,” as develops skilled workfore grows locally as the 
Massachusetts market develops..   
 
The forecasts here are based upon the expansion of existing technologies.  Wind 
technology, however, is still young.  The knowledge base and creativity in Massachusetts 
higher education and R&D sectors could well have a role to play in innovating and 
creating a new generation of offshore wind turbines.  
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Appendix A:  Input data to calculate LCOE 
 
Table A1 contains all input values used in the cost analysis.  As described in the text and 
Appendix B, the values in this table were developed through expert elicitation with 
offshore wind commercial experts.  The below are mean values from the group, 
sometimes a weighted mean based on our judgment about knowledge of the expert source 
of each particular cost.  The values below are the inputs to the LCOE calculations.  Small 
corrections and clarifications were made to Appendices in revision of 5 April 2016. 
 
Table A1.  Inputs used in LCOE calculationsa 
 
Input category Units Tranche A Tranche B Tranche C 
CAPEX     
Turbine $/kW $1,615 $1,424 $1,263 
Support Structure $/kW $681 $604 $527 
Installation (turbine and 
support structure) 
$/kW $369 $349 $324 
Within Farm Array Cable $/kW $176 $167 $154 
Development and permitting $/kW $191 $171 $144 
Financing, legal and other 
(including developer’s fee) 
$/kW $268 $240 $201 
Subtotal Generation cost $/kW $3,299 $2,956 $2,612 
Transmission Cost, AC radialf $/kW $1,112 $947 $968 
Total Cost  $/kW $4,411 $3,904 $3,580 
Contingency % 10 7 5 
Total Cost Inc. Contingency $/kW $4,852 $4,177 $3,759 
OpExb     
Fixed O&M Expense, Yr. 1 $/kW-yr $95.45 $83.60 $78.68 
Contingency % 10 
7 
5 
Fix O&M Expense, Yr.1 inc. 
Contingency 
$/kW-yr 105 89.45 82.61 
Decommissioningc 
$/kW $20 $20 $20 
Offshore Land Lease $/yr $146,250 $146,250 $146,250 
WACCd     
Construction Financing     
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Construction period Mos. 24 24 24 
Interest rate 
 
% 8.1 7.5 7 
Permanent Financinge     
Percent debt % 65 73 76 
Debt term Years 15 
15 
18 
Interest rate on debt term % 6.00 6.00 6.00 
Lender’s fee (% of total 
borrowing) 
% 2.50 2.50 2.50 
Req. minimum annual DSCR 
 
1.2 1.2 1.2 
Req. average DSCR 
 
1.45 1.45 1.45 
% equity 
 
35 28 24.5 
Target after tax equity IRR % 8 8 8 
AEP     
Turbine rating MW 8 8 8 
Downwind spacing Diameter 10 10 10 
Crosswind spacing Diameter 10 10 10 
NCF % 45.3 46.0 47.2 
Project useful life 
Years 25 25 25 
a Cost inputs before any learning impact applied.  
b  One experienced expert group told us their OpEx estimate represented a 16% reduction in cost for OpEx 
compared to the initial SIOW estimate.  This assumes that the OpEx figure has been calculated across the 
lifetime of the project (25yrs). They expected that the vast majority of lessons learnt from Europe can be 
applied to the US/Massachusetts projects, given that they are primarily logistic and experience/knowledge 
based. Technical innovations such as helicopter OpEx will also be directly applicable to projects in the 
US/Massachusetts market. 
c Decommissioning fee includes resale of salvaged materials, especially the subsea support structure. 
d WACC is in the 5-8.1% range, (8.1% for construction, 5.5% for operation) based on [55-76] % 
leveraging, 35% federal tax rate, and 8.5% state tax rate, see Table A2.  
e To some readers, the finance rates and debt-to-equity ratio may seem lower than expected.  It should be 
remembered that among the three developers who hold leases in the federally-designated RIMA AMI and 
MA WEA, two are owned by capital companies backing the project, and the third has been known to use its 
balance sheet to finance projects.  This explains the low cost of capital.  We are not saying every offshore 
wind project would achieve these terms, rather that the terms assumed reflect their capabilities. 
f Includes costs of offshore service platform and HV line to shore, not inter-array cables (see Table A3).  
Siemens product offer sheets promote 30% cost reduction in AC transmission, here we conservatively 
assume today’s costs (0% of new technology savings) for Tranche A, only 20% by Tranche B, and full 
30% only by Tranche C. 
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Table A2.  Tax and depreciation assumptions 
 
State tax rate   8.5% 
Federal tax rate   35 % 
Effective tax rate   40.5% 
Generation equipment  96% of CapEx is depreciated by 5-yr 
MACRS, 2% by 15-yr MACRS and 2% by 
20 yr SL (straight line) 
BOS  75% of CapEx by 5-yr MACRS, 25% by 
15-yr SL 
Interconnection 
(transmission) 
 100% 15-yr MACRS 
Development Costs/Fees  80% 5-yr MACRS, 5% 15yr-SL, 5% 20 yr 
SL and 10% is non depreciable 
Reserves and Financing 
Costs 
 50% 20yr-SL and 50% Non-depreciable 
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Table A3.  Cost inputs for Transmission – AC Radialsa 
 
Tranche A 
400MW 
FC 2020, COD 2023 
Electric Service Platform $100,000,000 
AC Radial $344,711,070 
Tranche A Total $444,711,070 
Tranche A ($/kW) $1,112 
Distances  40 miles offshore, 0.2 miles onshore 
Tranche B 
800MW 
FC 2023, COD 2026 
Electric Service Platform $200,000,000 
AC Radial $747,127,787 
Tranche B Total  $947,127,787 
Tranche B ($/kW) $1,184 
Distances  38 miles offshore, 4 miles onshore 
Tranche C 
800MW 
FC 2027, COD 2029 
Electric Service Platform $200,000,000 
AC Radial $905,971,522 
Tranche C Total $1,105,971,522 
Tranche C ($/kW) $1,382 
Distances 48 miles offshore, 4 miles onshore 
a Cost calculation before the cost reductions of announced new AC transmission 
technology is applied; Table A1 has costs after those technology cost reductions are 
applied.  Learning effects are not included this table, and learning savings were not 
applied to our transmission cost analysis.   
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Appendix B:  Expert Elicitation 
 
Selecting particularly knowledgeable individuals, picked for their expertise, and 
interviewing them is called “Expert elicitation”.  This is quite different from survey 
research, where many people are picked at random and asked about their preferences, or 
about topics on which they are not necessarily knowledgeable experts.  Here, expert 
elicitation methods were used to determine the inputs for the cost modeling. As described 
by Morgan, expert elicitation proceeds by seeking carefully reasoned judgments from 
experts about quantities or processes in their domains of expertise, often uncertain and 
thus in the form of subjective probability distributions.  This process has a well-
developed methodology.65 In some fields, expert elicitation may involve interviewing 10-
30 experts, weighting them equally and producing mean, mode and standard deviations of 
responses.  We selected by company rather than by individual, with each company 
typically having a team from 4 to 20 individuals working on US markets—calculating 
costs for projects, evaluating subcontractors, and judging market viability in the 
electricity markets where the power would be sold.  We contacted someone in or 
connected to the cost evaluation group within the company.  The group settled internal 
discrepancies and disagreements and gave us the company’s single number for reach 
variable.  Thus we were left with four “company consensus” numbers for each quantity 
we sought (below), or in some cases fewer than four because we discouraged but allowed 
not responding.  Below we describe how a single number was derived from each set of 
responses. 
 
For typical expert elicitation, Morgan recommends starting by asking the experts for the 
highest and lowest value possible, for each estimate being elicited, only after that asking 
them for their best judgment.66  However, here the numbers were already developed by 
the organizations and in most cases had already been subject to an internal review 
                                                
65 Morgan, M. Granger (1990). Uncertainty: A Guide to Dealing with Uncertainty in Quantitative and 
Risk and Policy Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
66 M. Granger Morgan, 2014, Use (and abuse) of expert elicitation in support of decision making for 
public policy.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 111 no. 20,  7176–7184, doi: 
10.1073/pnas.1319946111 
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process; also our request was an imposition on time, and we were asking for 27 numbers 
for each tranche, times 3 tranches, a total of 81.  To get participation, we had to make the 
process as rapid as possible, which precluded detailed questions for each quantity.  For 
the same reasons of respondent expediency, we provided a number based on our earlier 
New York Offshore Wind Cost Reduction Study, allowing them to “agree” or “do not 
object” if they felt our pre-provided number was close to their judgment.  The other 
choice was to “disagree,” in which case they had to offer a replacement number.  The 
pre-provided numbers were from earlier studies and therefore we expected they should be 
frequently corrected by newly collected data.  
 
Providing a suggested number to experts is not recommended in expert elicitation, as it 
tends to bias the respondent toward agreeing with the provided number or values closer to 
that.67  In this domain, for most experts in these companies, the costs of components, 
installation, and eventually, the cost of electricity are numbers that they live and breathe.  
They have measured wind and water depth, reviewed prior projects, obtained quotations, 
and run a program to calculate LCOE many times.  Most of the numbers to which they 
simply “agreed” were to standard terms, such as contractor contingency percentage and 
loan term, and to known rates and physical factors that can be measured such as lease 
rental cost, turbine size, and capacity factor in this region.  For the less standard and more 
important cost estimates, we observed that in most cases companies corrected our initial 
suggestion, increasing our confidence that our provision of default numbers did not bias 
the results.  We also observe that when a company gave “no objection” to our numbers, it 
was in area that we observed the company had less experience. 
For the composite numbers reported below and used in our LCOE calculation, all the 
elicited numbers are used, although they were not necessarily equally weighted.  In 
developing a single number, we followed these rules, in order: 
 
 1.  If all of the answers, from high to low of responses were within 10% of one 
another, we present the mean. 
                                                
67 Morgan, 2014, page 20, our provided value could have an “anchoring” effect. 
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2.  Otherwise, a weighted average is taken, with the following leading us to 
assign more weight: 
• Estimates	with	more	credible	back-up	references;	
• An	estimate	from	a	company	that	would	appear	to	have	more	knowledge	in	the	particular	category.		For	example,	if	they	had	already	built	a	wind	farm	in	similar	conditions,	or	if	they	had	quotes	from	(or	themselves	were)	an	appropriate	turbine	vendor.	
• After	above,	if	one	company	only	said	that	they	“do	not	object”,	their	“number”	(actually	in	this	case	our	suggested	number)	get	much	less	weight	than	others	who	provided	a	unique	calculation.	
 
A brief summary of the above is that we use a mean, but when dispersion is > 10%, we 
consider a self-admission, company experience, or our judgment, to give less weight to 
an estimate if the expert has less experience or less certainty.  Note also that all values 
given are used in the weighted mean, so that there is no way for any firm to identify the 
value given by another firm. 
 
Due to the complexity of the process that our experts followed, and their differing 
assumptions, we provided detailed instruction on the questions about what each meant, 
and in three cases, followed up with a phone call to insure they had answered the 
questions as asked.  As one example, contrary to instructions, at least two sources 
assumed market visibility, that is, their costs included a commitment to build all 2,000 
MW.  To avoid counting market visibility twice, we assumed that all the data on 
component costs already include market visibility; therefore, to calculate cost with and 
without, we added to the elicited cost to develop the input for LCOE without market 
visibility. 
 
As a check on the veracity of the expert informants, one might ask if there is another type 
of bias in that one source of estimates are developers who eventually would like to make 
bids on electricity in Massachusetts.  We have three types of check on this effect, none 
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perfect.   The first check is that we benchmark out numbers against other studies and 
industry sources who are not involved in Massachusetts’s bidding.  The second check is 
to consider the motivations and risks of the developers manipulating the prices.  Since a 
bill would come up before the Massachusetts legislature before the developers could bid, 
if the developers were gaming this, they might suggest that prices would be lower, to 
encourage passage of the bill.  The risk of that strategy would be that, if they 
accomplished this, the bill would be passed with a price cap calibrated to this price (price 
caps have been included in OSW legislation, in Maryland), which would then either cut 
into their profits and/or make it impossible for them to successfully bid on the project.  
This “double-bind” situation would seem to force them into a band of safety, where they 
do not bid lower than they can actually achieve, nor higher.  The third factor is that, for 3 
of our 4 sources, we discussed their numbers with the people in the company who 
produced them, and often asked them to justify individual numbers; we judged their 
answers plausible and often based on specific knowledge they have from several other 
projects, from bids, and from other experience they could relate to us.  The combination 
of these three checks, more than any one alone, leads us to conclude that the results are 
valid and are unlikely to have bias due to their commercial interest, or other biases. 
 
In addition to the above potential method biases, there is a potential commercial bias in 
collecting inputs from experts whose firms are potential bidders in this market.  Because 
they would benefit from a law obligating the purchase of offshore wind energy they may 
want to make the costs appear lower then they are.  The countervailing risk to these 
experts is that policymakers could legislate the LCOE numbers resulting from their inputs 
as a ceiling price for bids.  The European use of strike prices matched to cost reduction 
targets and to “what the industry says it can achieve” indeed illustrates this possibility.  
We judge the risk of providing low estimates to be a much greater risk to expert 
informants’ firms, therefore we do not believe commercial bias has led to unrealistically 
low inputs or resulting LCOE prices.  
